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Abstract
In this paper we describe an algorithm for predicting the websites at risk in a
long range hacking activity, while jointly inferring the provenance and evolution
of vulnerabilities on websites over continuous time. Specifically, we use hazard
regression with a time-varying additive hazard function parameterized in a general-
ized linear form. The activation coefficients on each feature are continuous-time
functions constrained with total variation penalty inspired by hacking campaigns.
We show that the optimal solution is a 0th order spline with a finite number of
adaptively chosen knots, and can be solved efficiently. Experiments on real data
show that our method significantly outperforms classic methods while providing
meaningful interpretability.
1 Introduction
Websites get hacked, whenever they are subject to a vulnerability that is known to the attacker,
whenever they can be discovered efficiently, and, whenever the attacker has efficient means of
hacking at his disposal. This combination of knowledge, opportunity, and tools is quite crucial
in shaping the way a group of sites receives unwanted attention by hackers. Unfortunately, as an
observer we are not privy to either one of these three properties.
Exploits are first discovered by highly skilled hackers who will use them for their own purposes for an
extended period of time, as long as there is an ample supply of hackable sites that can be discovered
efficiently. Once the opportunity for such hacks diminishes due to exhausted supply, the appropriate
vulnerabilities are often published. The available tools increase and they are added to the repertoire
of popular rootkits, at the ready disposal of ’script kiddies’ who will attempt to attack the remaining
sites. The increased availability of tools often offsets the reduced opportunity to yield a secondary
wave of infections.
In a nutshell, the above leads to the following statistical assumptions on how vulnerability of sites
and the infectious behavior occurs. Firstly, sites are only practically vulnerable once a vulnerability
is discovered. Second, as time passes, the propensity of an attack might increase or not, but changes
in attack behavior are discrete rather than gradual.
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We propose a novel hazard regression model that provides a clear description of the probability a
site getting hacked conditioned on its time-varying features, therefore allowing prediction tasks such
as finding websites at risk, or inferential tasks such as attributing attacks to certain features as well
as identifying change points of the activations of certain features to be conducted with statistical
rigor.
Related work. The primary strategy for identifying web-based malware has been to detect an
active infection based on features such as small iFrames [9]. This approach has been pursued by both
academia (e.g. [1, 6]) and industry (e.g. [5, 10, 11]). Soska & Christin [15] propose a data driven
(linear classification) approach to identify software packages that were being targeted by attackers to
predict the security outcome of websites.
2 Hazard Regression
Hazard regression aims to estimate the chances of survival of a particular event with covariates x,
as a function of time, such as to better understand the effects of x. Instead of directly modeling
the cumulative survival distribution, people are interested in the instantaneous rate of dying of
any x at any given time t, i.e. hazard rate λ(x, t). The density of dying at time t is given by
p(t|x) = λ(x, t) p (survival until t|x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
F (t|x)
. This leads to a differential equation for the survival probability
with solution F (t|x) = exp
(
− ∫ t
0
λ(x, τ)dτ
)
.
In our case, death amounts to a site being infected and λ(x, t) is the rate at which such an infection
occurs. An extremely useful fact of hazard regression is that it is additive. That is, if there are
two causes with rates λ and γ respectively, it allows us to add the rates and this leads to F (t|x) =
exp
(
− ∫ t
0
λ(x, τ) + γ(x, τ)dτ
)
and p(t|x) = [λ(x, t) + γ(x, t)]F (t, x). The reason why this is
desirable in our case follows from the fact that we may now model λ as the sum of attacks in a
generalized linear form.
Most hazard regression approaches are based on the Cox’s propotional hazard model λ(t|x) =
λ0(t) exp(w
>x) [3], including parametric models, and nonparametric models with baseline hazard
rate λ0(t) unspecified [4]. The proportional assumption may not hold because of the time-varying
effect of covariates [2]. As a result, time-dependent effect models that allow w(t) as functions over
time for each feature are proposed. Typically people developed time functions based on fractional
polynomials [14], or spline functions [7]. Due to the huge parameter space, techniques like reduced
rank methods [12] and structured penalized methods [16, 17, 13] are studied. However those works
either search for global smoothing functions or need to pre-specify knots. Typically they work on
tens of features. Our work inspired by hacking campaigns aims to identify discrete attack behaviors.
We show the optimal solutioin is a 0th order spline with knots adaptively chosen over continuous
time.
3 Attributing Hacks
3.1 Additive hazard function and variational maximum likelihood
The blacklist may not always immediately discover whether a site has been taken over. The probability
that this happens in some time interval [ti, Ti] is given by F (ti, xi) − F (Ti, xi), named “interval
censoring”. On another hand, the absence of evidence of an infection does not mean the evidence of
absence. In other words, all we know is that the site survived until time T , named “right censoring”.
The probability is thus given by F (T, xi). Time T denotes the end of the observation. Given intervals
[ti, Ti] of likely infection for site i ∈ {1, ..., n}, at time T we have the following likelihood for the
observed data: ∏
i∈hacked
[F (ti, xi)− F (Ti, xi)]
∏
i 6∈hacked
F (T, xi).
It remains to specify the hazard function λ(x, t). We do not wish to make strong parametric
assumptions, but since x ∈ Rd is high-dimensional, estimating λ(x, t) completely non-parametrically
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is intractable. We thus make an additive assumption and expand the hazard function into an inner
product λ(x, t) = 〈x(t), w(t)〉 = w0(t) +
∑d
i=1 xi(t)wi(t). This is still an extremely rich class of
functions as xi(t) can be different over time and wi(t) is allowed to be any univariate nonnegative
functions over continuous time. Furthermore, based on our intuition, λ(x, t) is not a smoothly
changing function, but can jump suddenly in response to certain events. It may not have a small
or even bounded Lipschitz constant. We therefore constrain complexity of the function class via
total variations (TV). Then we can learn the model by solving the variational penalized maximum
likelihood problem below:
min
(w0,w1,...,wd)∈Fd
n∑
i=1
`({xi, zi, ψi};w) + γ
d∑
j=0
TV(wj)
s.t. wj(t+ δ)− wj(t) ≥ 0 for any j ∈ [d], t ∈ R, δ ∈ R+
(1)
where zi is the indicator of censoring type for observation xi, i.e. interval-censored or right-censored;
ψi := {ti, Ti, T} is the associated censoring time; wj(t) is the evaluation of function wj at time t.
Note that the monotone constraint is optional and can be removed to form a “non-monotone” model.
There, only issue is that (1) is an infinite dimensional function optimization problem and could be
very hard to solve.
3.2 Variational characterization
The following theorem provides a finite set of simple basis functions that can always represent at
least one of the solution to (1).
Theorem 1 (Representer Theorem). Assume no observations are uncensored, feature xi(t) for each
user is piecewise constant over time with finite number of change points. Let sτ (t) = 1(t ≥ τ) be the
step function at τ . There exists an optimal solution (w1, ..., wd) of the above problem such that for
each j = 1, .., d,
wj(t) =
n∑
τ∈T
sτ (t)c
(j)
τ
for some set T that collects all censoring boundaries and places where feature xj(t) changes, and
coefficient vector c(j) ∈ R|T |.
The direct consequence of Theorem 1 is that we can now represent piecewise constant functions by
vectors in R|T | and solve (1) by solving a tractable finite dimensional fused lasso problem (with an
optional isotonic constraints) of the form:
min
w0,w1,...,wd∈R|T |
n∑
i=1
`({xi, zi, ψi};w) + γ
d∑
j=0
‖Dwj‖1
s.t. wj(`+ 1)− wj(`) ≥ 0, for any j = 1, ..., d, ` = 1, ..., |T | − 1.
(2)
where we abuse the notation to denote wj as evaluations of function wj at sorted time points in T ;
and D ∈ R(|T |−1)×|T | is the discrete difference operator.
4 Experiments
We evaluate the out-of-sample predictive power measured by log-likelihood and conduct case studies
of learned latent hazard rate on real data via domain expert’s knowledge.
4.1 Real-World Data
The data used for evaluation was sourced from the work of Soska et al. [15] and was compromised
as a collection of interval censored sites from backlists and right censored sites randomly sampled
from .com domains 1.
1A .com zone file is the list of all registered .com domains at the time.
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All the sites were drawn from The Wayback Machine2 when archives were available at appropriate
dates. A total of 49,347 blacklists were collected between 2011 to 2013, include a blacklist of
predominately phishing3, and search redireciton attacks [8]. The .com zone files during the same
period are randomly sampled, served as right censored sites with a total of 336,671.
We automatically extracted raw tags and attributes from webpages, that served as features (a total of
159,000 features). These tags and attributes could be like <br>, or <meta> WordPress 2.9.2</meta>.
Our corpus of features corresponds to a very large set of distinct and diverse software packages or
content management systems.
4.2 Real-World Numeric Results
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Figure 1: Convergence on training data (left) and test data (right) respectively.
The baseline method is the classic Cox Proportional model (Cox) [3] which have been extensively
used for hazard regression and survival analysis. It’s parametrized based on the features with constant
coeffcients over time. We use “`1” to denote the model penalized with ‖Dw>‖1.
An experimental comparison between our models and Cox on the aforementioned dataset are reported
in Figure 1 (left and right). Apparently the Cox model underfit the data quite a bit. Our “monotone”
model allows only monotone hazard rate underfit the data a little but still significantly outperforms
Cox. It is well expected that “non-monotone” model without any constraint overfit the data severely.
“`1+non-monotone” model which is well regularized performs the best. This result clearly shows that
the latent hazard rate recovered by our model is much better than the Cox’s model. To achieve such
accuracy, our model uses only around 3 times parameter size compared with Cox model.
4.2.1 Real-World Case Study
In this section, we manually inspect the model’s ability to automatically discover known security
events. Figure 2 (left) demonstrates some of the differences between the monotone and non-monotone
models by following the hazard assigned to features that correspond to Wordpress 3.5.1. In early
2013, our dataset recorded a few malicious instances of Wordpress 3.5.1 sites (among some benign
ones). These initial samples appeared to be part of a small scale test or proof of concept by the
adversary to demonstrate their ability to exploit the platform. Both models detect these security
events and respond by assigning a non-zero hazard.
Following the small scale test was a lack of activity for a few weeks, during which the non-monotone
model relaxes its hazard rate back down to zero, just before an attack campaign on a much larger
scale is launched. This example illustrates once a vulnerability for a software package is known,
2The Wayback Machine is a service that archives parts of the web.
3A phishing website is a website that impersonates another site such as a bank, typically to trick users and
steal credentials.
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Figure 2: Estimated hazard rates (both “monotone” and “non-monotone”) correspond to instances
of Wordpress 3.2.1 and Wordpress 3.5.1 (left).; Estimated hazard rates (“monotone”) correspond to
different versions of Wordpress that were attacked in the summer of 2011 (right).
that package is always at risk, even if it is not actively being exploited. On the other hand, the
non-monotone model captures the notion that adversaries tend to work in batches or attack campaigns.
Previous work [15] has shown that it is economically efficient for adversaries to compromise similar
sites in large batches, and after a few attack campaigns, most vulnerable websites tend to be ignored.
This phenomena is shown in Figure 2 (left) where Wordpress 3.2.1 was attacked in late 2011 and
then subsequently ignored with the exception of a few small attacks that were likely orthogonal to the
underlying software and any observable content features.
It can be observed from Figure 2 (right) that a number of distinct Wordpress distributions experienced
a change-point in the summer of 2011. This phenomina was present in several of the most popular
versions of Wordpress in the dataset including versions 2.8.5, 2.9.2 and 3.2.1. This type of correlation
between the hazard of features corresponding to different versions of a software package is expected.
This correlation often occurs when adversaries exploit vulnerabilities which are present in multiple
versions of a package, or plugins and third party add-ons that share compatibility across the different
packages.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel survival analysis-based approach to model the latent process of
websites getting hacked over time. The proposed model attempts to solve a variational total variation
penalized optimization problem, and we show that the optimal function can be linearly represented
by a set of step functions with the jump points known to as ahead of time. The results suggest that by
correctly recovering the latent hazard rate, our model significantly outperforms the classic Cox model.
Compared with known time-dependent hazard regression models, our models work on several orders
of larger feature space. Most importantly, identifying the changes of each feature’s susceptibility over
time can help people understand the latent hacking campaigns and leverage these insights to take
appropriate actions.
In future, further works can be made to study the relations among potential correlated features
by investigating the structures (e.g. low rank) of the coefficient matrix w ∈ Rd×T , or via deeper
transformation. On the other hand, the same model (variants) can be used in many other settings to
study consumer spending behaviors, marriage, animal habits and so on.
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